## Aff Answers

### Thumpers

#### Ukraine war will thump for years into the future

RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service, 6-19-2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-syevyerodonetsk-belarus-arms-nato-putin-zelenskiy/31901661.html, "NATO Says Ukraine Fighting Could Last Years As Russians Pound Eastern Cities," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)

NATO's secretary-general has warned that the war in Ukraine could go on for years and urged the supply of state-of-the-art weapons to Kyiv even if "costs are high," as Ukraine's allies sought to preempt any international "fatigue" nearly four months into Russia's unprovoked invasion.

The cautions came as Russia stepped up its offensives against Syevyerodonetsk and other eastern Ukrainian cities, and with the European Union readying for a recommendation next week to make Ukraine a candidate to join the bloc.

"We must prepare for the fact that it could take years. We must not let up in supporting Ukraine," NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told Germany's Bild am Sonntag newspaper in comments published on June 19.

"Even if the costs are high, not only for military support, also because of rising energy and food prices."

Following his visit to Kyiv on June 18 to show support for Ukraine, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson wrote in London's Sunday Times that "time is the vital factor" and "everything will depend on whether Ukraine can strengthen its ability to defend its soil faster than Russia can renew its capacity to attack."

Johnson spoke of the need to avoid "Ukraine fatigue" from a conflict that has killed tens of thousands of Ukrainians and displaced more than 10 million others since Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his troops across the border on February 24.

Syevyerodonetsk, the focus of Russia’s offensive to capture full control of the eastern Ukrainian region of Luhansk, remained under heavy artillery fire on June 19, as did the sister city of Lysychansk, just across the Severskiy Donets River.

The Ukrainian General Staff said early on June 19 that Russian troops eere concentrating their main efforts in the direction of Syevyerodonetsk and Bakhmut.

The Russian Defense Ministry said it had taken control of Metyolkine, a town about 6 kilometers southeast of Syevyerodonetsk that had a population of about 800 before the war. TASS reported that many Ukrainian fighters had surrendered there.

Ukraine's military said Russia had "partial success" in the area, but Serhiy Hayday, the military governor of Luhansk, told Ukrainian television that the Russians' claims that they control Syevyerodonetsk are false.

"They control the main part of the town but not the whole town," he said, adding that the fighting made evacuations from the city impossible.

Despite heavy shelling of Syevyerodonestk's twin city, Lysychansk, it was possible to evacuate 19 people from there, Hayday said.

"Today, 19 residents of Lysychansk have already exhaled with relief and are in a place where shells do not fly overhead," Hayday said on Telegram.

The British Defense Ministry said in an intelligence update on June 19 that there was "little change in the front line" in recent days in the so-called Syevyerodonetsk pocket where Russian forces are hoping to encircle Ukraine's defenders.

But the ministry also warned that Ukrainian and Russian combat units "committed to intense combat in the Donbas" are probably suffering "variable morale," citing information from U.K. intelligence services.

Ukrainian and Western intelligence have pointed for months to signs of poor morale and even fragging among invading Russian soldiers since the February 24 invasion began.

But the British statement is among the strongest indications so far of morale problems among Ukrainians, who mobilized military and civilian defenders to resist the Russians.

"Ukrainian forces have likely suffered desertions in recent weeks," the Defense Ministry said in its latest intelligence update on Ukraine. "Russian morale highly likely remains especially troubled. Cases of whole Russian units refusing orders and armed stand-offs between officers and their troops continue to occur."

Reliable casualty estimates from either side have been difficult to come by.

The Ukrainian side suggests more than 30,000 Russian soldiers have been killed, although Western intelligence has suggested the number is considerably lower.

The Ukrainian side has not said how many of its troops or other defenders have died, although Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy recently suggested as many as 100 Ukrainian soldiers are being killed every day.

#### NATO expansion to Finland/Sweden thumps

Alexander Korolev, 2-24-2022, U-NSW Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales. He is currently completing a book manuscript on the theory of strategic alignments with special reference to the China-Russia alignment. https://iai.tv/articles/only-neutrality-can-save-the-geopolitical-deadlock-auid-2140, "," IAI TV - Changing how the world thinks (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)

Finally, the expansion of NATO into Sweden and Finland has poignantly demonstrated that despite the war, Ukraine remains a third-rank citizen in the West. Sweden and Finland were warmly welcomed by NATO even before they formally applied. Ukraine, in turn, despite all its efforts to join NATO, was designated by Boris Johnson on 6 March 2022 as the country that “had no serious prospects of NATO membership in the near future.” This was echoed, on 11 March 2022, by Josep Borrell, who reflectively admitted with regards to Ukraine’s NATO membership that “it’s a mistake to make promises that you can’t keep.”

The limits of the West’s support of Ukraine are crystal clear to Putin and the rest of the world. Regardless of what Russia does in Ukraine, there will be no NATO membership and no collective security guarantees for Ukraine. Moreover, this round of NATO expansion brings the “enemy” to the gate of Russia and corroborates Putin’s besieged-fortress ideology. Thus, Putin has managed to create the world he has been warning Russians and Russia’s allies about: the West is indeed fully out to encircle Russia. This self-fulfilling prophecy shores up Putin’s rhetoric within Russia and signals to China that the West does pose a danger to Russia and is more interested in harming Russia’s geopolitical interests than helping Ukraine. This recognition strengthens China-Russia alignment which will further buttress Russia’s capacity to carry on in Ukraine.

#### Western sanctions thump

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)

In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the West has imposed stinging sanctions, disrupting the Russian economy and forcing the Kremlin to burn through its financial reserves. Major Russian banks have been disconnected from SWIFT, the international system that facilitates financial transactions, while some oligarchs have been sanctioned. Many allies and partners have provided massive financial and material aid—in the form of funding, as well as anti-tank and air-defense systems and other military equipment—to bolster Ukrainian resistance. This assistance has helped to stiffen an already stout Ukrainian defense, which has inflicted heavy losses on the Russian military. Vladimir Putin now faces the real possibility of a stalled offensive, or even outright defeat.

#### Russian failure in Ukraine thumps

Mohammed Cherkaoui, 6-26-2022, GMU professor of Conflict Resolution and Diplomacy at George Mason University in Washington and Joaan Bin Jassim Academy for Defence Studies in Doha. https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/russia-nato-four-political-variants-under-review, "Russia-NATO: Four Political Variants under Review," Al Jazeera Center for Studies (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)

Balance of power

Since the war erupted in Ukraine, there has been increasing caution in EU and NATO headquarters in Brussels about how to deal best with the Kremlin’s strategy and to avoid any armed confrontation in eastern Europe. Military historian Rick Atkinson conceives the new order of battle in Europe as very fluid. He points out, “in less than three months, the strategic landscape has changed profoundly — invigorating a NATO military alliance that had seemed nearly moribund, undermining if not neutering Russian imperial ambitions, and reasserting American leadership in a robust coalition of like-minded liberal democracies.” (27)

Henry Kissinger, former U.S. secretary of state and so-called ‘master of grand strategy’ said at a Financial Times forum held in June 2022, “We are now living in a totally new era.” He also argued that Putin “obviously miscalculated Russia’s capabilities to sustain a major enterprise — and when the time comes for settlement … we are not going back to the previous relationship but to a position for Russia that will be different because of this — and not because we demanded it but because they produced it.” (28)

#### Thump: Ukraine military aid

George Allison, 6-27-2022, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/nato-increases-high-alert-force-from-40000-to-300000-troops/, "NATO increases high alert force from 40,000 to 300,000 troops," UK Defence Journal (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)

The Ukrainian government and people continue to resist Russia’s brutal war of aggression. Their courage and commitment are an inspiration. And I welcome that President Zelenskyy will join us at the NATO Summit. NATO and Allies have provided substantial support to Ukraine since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Including with military and financial aid. And training for tens of thousands of Ukrainian forces. All of this is making a difference on the battlefield every day. And since the invasion in February, Allies have stepped up even more. With billions of euros’ worth of military, financial, and humanitarian assistance. At the Summit, we will agree a strengthened Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. This will include substantial deliveries of support. In areas like secure communications, anti-drone systems, and fuel. Over the longer term, we will help Ukraine transition from Soviet-era military equipment, to modern NATO equipment. And further strengthen its defence and security institutions. At the Summit, we will also take decisions to continue adapting NATO.”

#### Thump: NATO RRF expansion

George Allison, 6-27-2022, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/nato-increases-high-alert-force-from-40000-to-300000-troops/, "NATO increases high alert force from 40,000 to 300,000 troops," UK Defence Journal (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)

The almost eight times increase in NATO Response Force troops is due to the threat posed by Russia, say the Alliance.

For clarity, the NATO Response Force is a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational combat force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg gave a speech today ahead of a meeting in Madrid amongst NATO allies set to adopt a new strategy for the Alliance. The strategy reportedly describes Moscow as a direct threat.

Stoltenberg said:

“Our NATO Summit in Madrid this week will be transformative. With many important decisions. Including on a new Strategic Concept for a new security reality. A fundamental shift in NATO’s deterrence and defence. And support to Ukraine now, and for the future.

Our new Concept will guide us in an era of strategic competition. I expect it will make clear that Allies consider Russia as the most significant and direct threat to our security. It will address China for the first time. And the challenges that Beijing poses to our security, interests, and values. It will also cover our evolving approach to a number of other threats and challenges. Including terrorism, cyber, and hybrid. At the Summit, we will strengthen our forward defences.

We will enhance our battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance up to brigade-levels. We will transform the NATO Response Force. And increase the number of our high readiness forces to well over 300,000.

We will also boost our ability to reinforce in crisis and conflict.Including with:

More pre-positioned equipment, and stockpiles of military supplies.

More forward-deployed capabilities, like air defence.

Strengthened command and control.

And upgraded defence plans, with forces pre-assigned to defend specific Allies.

These troops will exercise together with home defence forces.

And they will become familiar with local terrain, facilities, and our new pre-positioned stocks. So that they can respond smoothly and swiftly to any emergency. Together, this constitutes the biggest overhaul of our collective deterrence and defence since the Cold War. And to do this, we will need to invest more. Today, we are releasing new defence spending figures. They show that 2022 will be the eighth consecutive year of increases across European Allies and Canada. By the end of the year, they will have invested well over 350 billion US dollars extra since we agreed our defence investment pledge in 2014. Nine Allies now reach – or exceed – the 2% target. Nineteen Allies have clear plans to reach it by 2024. And an additional five have concrete commitments to meet it thereafter. Two percent is increasingly considered a floor, not a ceiling. We will also agree to invest more together in NATO. For the benefit of our security.

### Turn – Plan Helps Ukraine

#### NATO unity checks Ukraine escalation

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)

Preventing and controlling escalation

What can NATO and the European Union do to prevent Russia from escalating the conflict to unacceptable levels? What follows are a few principles to guide NATO’s assessment of preventing and avoiding escalation.

Keep Ukraine in the fight. The first, and most immediate, curative is to keep Ukraine in the war. This means continued financial assistance, shipments of lethal aid, and real-time intelligence sharing, as well as humanitarian assistance and help with absorption and resettlement of refugees. The United States and Europe have shown unity and concerted action in responding swiftly to Russian aggression in Ukraine and this must continue, even as Putin seeks to find and drive wedges between transatlantic allies and partners. In this struggle, a coherent narrative, shared and articulated in common, will be critical.

In this regard, continuous references to the danger of escalation to “World War III” and a steady drumbeat of measures not to be taken can only serve to reassure Putin that he has a free hand in Ukraine. A degree of strategic ambiguity and the possibility of US and NATO intervention should he go too far can be helpful in moderating Russian excesses and controlling escalation. An “all measures on the table” approach will force Russian planners to consider, and prepare for, multiple response scenarios, complicating resource allocation and inducing uncertainty. While deterrence is more art than science, signaling to one’s opponent that one is too frightened to engage is more likely to encourage than to deter.

The most effective way to prevent spillover onto NATO territory and other forms of future Russian aggression is to help defeat Russian forces in the field inside Ukraine. Supplying Ukraine with food, fuel, spare parts, and modern equipment is the best way to do that, while still avoiding direct intervention by NATO. This means combat aircraft, main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled and rocket artillery, mobile air defense, secure radios, unmanned aerial vehicles, target-acquisition radars, spare parts, and ammunition, including precision-guided munitions. Many of these combat systems exist in storage in great numbers in the United States and in Europe. The Ukrainian military has shown remarkable versatility in adapting to unfamiliar systems such as the Javelin and Stinger, but exportable training packages, and even training sites in Europe for selected specialists, also warrant consideration.

#### Only resilience and persistence can check Putin in Ukraine

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Use economic tools as a primary “offensive” weapon. As the military campaign progresses, sanctions will continue to strangle the Russian economy. This pressure must continue—and, if possible, intensify—in order to force Russia, not just to the negotiating table, but to withdraw altogether from Ukrainian territory. To date, not all Russian banks have been banned from SWIFT, and many oligarchs remain unsanctioned. Though painful and difficult, weaning Europe from Russian energy, divesting from Russian businesses, and closing European markets are powerful weapons the EU can wield in its own right. (While 37 percent of Russian trade is with Europe, only 4 percent of the EU’s goods exports go to Russia.) Today, Russian energy remains exempt from EU sanctions. Developing alternate sources of energy, in particular, will take time and investment, but continued reliance on Russian oil and natural gas can only enable Putin to continue to finance the war in Ukraine.

In March 2022, the EU imposed its fourth tranche of trade sanctions on Russia, tightening export restrictions on dual-use technologies, expanding the list of sanctioned persons related to defense industries; imposing further trade restrictions for steel, iron, and luxury goods; and prohibiting transactions with specific state-owned enterprises. The challenge now will be to maintain the full range of sanctions until they bear fruit. Global food shortages, rising energy prices, and scarcities among certain commodities will challenge the sanctions regime. Much depends on the persistence and resolve of Western leaders.

Properly understood, comprehensive economic sanctions against Russia—what the French finance minister has called “total economic and financial war on Russia”—can be a major tool, denying Putin the financial resources to carry on the war and generating internal pressures on elites that could lead to his removal. By themselves, however, they will probably not end the war. China, Brazil, and India remain open markets and suppliers, if not active supporters, while Hungary and Serbia retain close ties. As former Deputy National Security Adviser General Rick Waddell has pointed out to the author, “An economy that is self-sufficient in energy and food takes a lot of killing.” In concert with diplomacy, aggressive information operations, and the military instrument of power, sanctions can be a vital component of an overall strategy to control and limit escalation and drive conflict termination by draining Russia of the financial resources it needs to carry on the war.

#### Only solidification solves Ukraine and avoids Russian expansionism

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Maintain unity on the diplomatic front. In the midst of aggressive warfare, diplomacy may not capture the headlines. But, it must remain in play, above all because political objectives in the end must govern what happens on the battlefield. Here there are minefields. NATO and the EU may be tempted to intervene in negotiations and offer solutions—“off ramps” is au courant—to more quickly achieve a cessation of hostilities. These could take the form of sanctions relief and acknowledgement of Russian sovereignty over parts of Ukraine in exchange for “peace.” This would be a fatal error.

Practitioners of realpolitik may minimize Zelenskyy’s emphasis on shared values and the ongoing contest between democracy and autocracy, but his citizenry and millions in Europe and the United States won’t. Despite the leverage the West has over Ukraine as its storehouse and quartermaster, the Ukrainian people will decide “how this ends.” The political endgame—the definition of “victory”—must reflect outcomes they deem worthy of the enormous sacrifices they have made. The trap here is that Putin will not give up his aspirations if allowed to keep some of his gains, restore his finances, rebuild his forces, and try again.

The West has an opportunity to rule out that future altogether. That outcome rests on continued pressure, assistance to Ukraine, a resolute and united front, and the willingness to confront Russia decisively should Putin expand the conflict. Western diplomacy must be based on more than “stopping the fighting.” The United States and its allies must see through and beyond the endgame to a stable and lasting peace. That means the comprehensive defeat of the Russian military in Ukraine, before the conflict metastasizes further and spreads into Europe and beyond.

Throughout, diplomacy should leverage the strong, worldwide opposition to Russian aggression—as expressed in the UN General Assembly’s overwhelming vote of March 2—in all international forums. Traditional neutrals such as Sweden, Finland, and Austria have joined in strongly condemning Putin’s actions and have a growing voice. Building and sustaining this coalition should remain a top diplomatic priority.

#### Military aid in Ukraine checks Russia

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The most effective way to prevent spillover onto NATO territory and other forms of future Russian aggression is to help defeat Russian forces in the field inside Ukraine. Supplying Ukraine with food, fuel, spare parts, and modern equipment is the best way to do that, while still avoiding direct intervention by NATO. This means combat aircraft, main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled and rocket artillery, mobile air defense, secure radios, unmanned aerial vehicles, target-acquisition radars, spare parts, and ammunition, including precision-guided munitions. Many of these combat systems exist in storage in great numbers in the United States and in Europe. The Ukrainian military has shown remarkable versatility in adapting to unfamiliar systems such as the Javelin and Stinger, but exportable training packages, and even training sites in Europe for selected specialists, also warrant consideration.

### Ukraine Impact - LIO

#### Deterrence in shadow of Ukraine is the only hope for LIO

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Conclusion

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the most dangerous event to occur in Europe since the end of the Second World War. In its potential for enormous casualties, destruction on an epic scale, and escalation to unthinkable extremes, it demands the attention and considered action of NATO, the European Union, and the whole world. No one can see clearly exactly how the crisis will play out. This “strange voyage,” in Winston Churchill’s words, is a journey into the unknown, as all wars are. The best the West can do is prepare for the worst, keep its nerve, and employ all its resources when its vital interests and most cherished values are attacked. Things are very close to that stage now. At stake is an international order founded on something other than brute force, imperial ambition, and autocratic self-help. A Russian victory in Ukraine, even at great cost, places a vengeful Putin on Europe’s doorstep, his ambitions partially achieved but still unrealized. The next blow will fall on NATO’s eastern flank. Now is the time to ensure that never happens.

**Decline ensures transition wars, not peaceful multilateralism---the US could launch a pre-emptive attack or China could strike first**

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Underlying these arguments for an inevitable war between the two superpowers is PTT. PTT originally formulated by Organski (1958) posits that **war is likely** when the power of the dominant state in the international system (i.e. hegemon) is **declining** and that a dissatisfied rising challenger **substantially reduces the power gap between the hegemon and itself**. Unlike balance of power theory, PTT argues that the war is most likely when there is near power parity between a dominant state and a rising and dissatisfied challenger (Organski and Kugler, 1980, pp. 19-20)[5]. A rising power here is generally dissatisfied with the existing international order and **initiates war against a declining hegemon in order to impose orders that are more favorable to itself** (Organski 1958, pp. 364-367). Layne (2018, p. 110) put these power transition dynamics quite succinctly as follows: “Over time, however, the relative power of states changes, and eventually the international order no longer reflects the actual distribution of power between or among the leading Great Powers. When that happens, the legitimacy of the prevailing order is called into question, and it will be challenged by the rising power(s).” And when the balance of power between a dominant state and a rising challenger changes sufficiently, a new order replaces an old one typically **by a hegemonic war** (2018, p. 104). Paying close attention to the **growing Sino–US competition** over hegemony in the twenty-first century, therefore, Shirk (2007, p. 4), China specialist, argues that “History teaches us that rising powers are likely to provoke war.” On the other hand, scholars like Gilpin (1981) contend that the power transition war between great powers is likely to occur when a hegemonic state whose power is declining due to imperial overstretch[6] views “**preventive war as the most attractive means of eliminating the threat** posed by challengers” (Ned Lebow and Valentino, 2009, p. 391), although they do acknowledge that there might be some “ways to prolong the period of its power preponderance vis-à-vis the rising challenger, so that the rapidly rising power will not dare to challenge the hegemonic leadership” (Kim and Gates, 2015, p. 221). In this case, the initiator of war is a declining hegemon, rather than a rising challenger. The declining hegemon who fears a rising challenger’s overtaking its power in the near future **sees war as a better option** than other options of maintaining its hegemony such as reducing its commitments abroad and appeasing a rising challenger.

### Ukraine Impact - Genocide

#### Ukraine genocide will force NATO intervention

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If NATO intervenes, do it decisively. Several European nations, including Poland, Denmark, and Belgium, are considering some form of “peacekeeping” intervention in Ukraine, while calls for a no-fly zone are mounting as the civilian death toll rises. This suggests a critical mass of support may be forming for outside intervention under certain circumstances. Strong material and financial aid may enable Ukraine to hold on, and even advance to retake occupied territory, but Russia remains a far larger and stronger opponent. If the logic that it is better to defeat Putin in Ukraine than on NATO territory is sound, intervention to prevent the fall of Ukraine or its dismemberment must be considered. The prospect of actual genocide of Ukrainian civilians, or use of weapons of mass destruction, might also trigger NATO intervention.

### Ukraine Impact – Asia Pivot

#### Weakening Russia in Ukraine enables Asia Pivot

Marc De Vore, 6-15-2022, School of International Relations - Senior Lecturer https://ucigcc.org/news/what-ukraine-is-teaching-us-about-geoeconomics/, "What Ukraine Is Teaching Us About Geoeconomics," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)

Another difference is that this is the first conflict involving quasi-alliances. NATO and the EU are not participants in the war, but they’re clearly involved and not neutral. Russia has a series of partnerships— the cooperative treaty organization and its strategic partnership with China—which are also in play.

One of the questions this war raises is: what does the war’s outcome mean for the U.S. pivot toward Asia? And I think that raises two other questions. One is: how diminished will Russia be at the end? Since Barack Obama, the U.S. has been trying to pivot towards Asia because China is clearly the larger and more significant long-term competitor. But Vladimir Putin is sticking around Eastern Europe and kicking the Western order in the shins. That has made it very difficult to pivot towards Asia. On the other hand, if this war ends with Russia being a crippled power, then, in that sense, pivoting towards Asia is going to be much were easier if what one is dealing with in Europe is a very weakened Vladimir Putin with a decrepit military that can’t reconstitute itself.

### Ukraine Impact - Food

#### Ukraine puts food security on brink

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Poorer countries are currently facing the prospect of a major food crisis. While much attention has been paid to the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports, which disrupts supplies, even if the ports become operational again the problem will remain. First, rising energy prices are already translating to higher transportation costs of basic goods, driving up the prices of basic foodstuffs. Second, Ukraine and Russia are major exporters of basic foodstuffs—together they supply almost 29% of the world’s exports of wheat brands, 20% of corn, and 80% of sunflower oil. While the Western economies have enough margins to address these rising prices, the situation in the poorer corners of the world is different—as indicated by the Economist front page showing human skulls in a sheaf of grain. According to David Beasley, the executive director of the UN World Food Programme, 50% of the wheat supplied by the organization was coming from Ukraine. Russia is also a prime exporter of indispensable ingredients in fertilizers—potash and phosphate. When Ukrainian farmers are preoccupied with defending their land in the beginning of the seeding season, and when Russian farmers cannot be paid due to the exclusion of Russia from the SWIFT system, rising food prices threaten to bring more instability into already unstable countries. Just a few weeks into the conflict and the spiraling prices of food and other basic commodities ignited protests and rallies in Iraq and Morocco. According to the Financial Times, “a jump in grain prices in 2009-10 is regarded as one of the triggers of the Arab Spring in the Middle East.” The looming global food crisis threatens to have yet more destructive consequences, including more conflicts and more refugees.

Many in the West have praised the decisiveness of the EU’s effort to protect Ukrainian refugees escaping the war. While the unprecedented deal—that grants Ukrainians instant rights to live and work within the EU—is more than welcome in itself, many human rights groups and organizations have been clamoring that it demonstrates the EU’s “double standards” in comparison to the 2015 refugee crisis. “The Ukraine refugee crisis,” argues the Global Detention Project (GDP), a Geneva-based nonprofit organization, “presents Europe with . . . a critical moment of reflection: Can the peoples of Europe overcome their widespread racism and animosity and embrace the universalist spirit of the 1951 Refugee Conventions?” This question might become pivotal once food shortages start to affect societies in the Middle East and North Africa. This may expose not only the West’s moral bias but also systemic weaknesses of contemporary institutions that have shaped globalization processes during the last decades, such as migration regimes.

### Ukraine Impact - Economy

#### Ukraine war risks global supply chain collapse

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Western societies and economies will have to address these urgent sociopolitical challenges, which may arrive in tandem with other threats to the global order. The disruption caused by the war to the global economic model led Larry Fink, the chief executive of BlackRock and one of the world’s leading hedge fund investors, to write that “the Russian invasion of Ukraine has put an end to the globalization we have experienced over the last three decades.” Fink is worried about two further expected shockwaves. First, the globalized economy is amidst a supply chain crisis, which the war in Ukraine is aggravating further. Since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, shippers have tried to bypass the uncertainty of fraught container shipping by turning to rail transport as an alternative route for the Asia–Europe trade. Rail operators ran more than 1,200 freight trains per month between China and Europe, transiting through Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and transporting almost 1.5 million containers. The disruption caused by the blocking of land routes may result in more permanent and painful retreat by manufacturers from reliance on global supply chains. Second, the war in Ukraine may also disrupt technological innovation. For example, much of the world’s neon, which is crucial for the production of computer chips, originates in Russia, and 50% of this is purified in Ukraine. The interruption to supply chains and possible deficit of microchips are daunting scenarios for global economic development. But they may also come as a natural and much needed trend to cool down a radically decentralized, overcomplicated, and hence venerable global system of trade.

#### Decline cascades – nuclear war.

Maavak 21 – Dr. Mathew, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council. “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal, The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Vol. 9, No. 1, pg. 2-8, <https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/informit.673954589035546>, 04-14-2021

Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit.

According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019):

“You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author).

President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period.

A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016).

In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade.

ENVIRONMENTAL

What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation:

The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs.

Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated.

Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity.

Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021).

Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications.

On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008).

The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section.

Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade.

GEOPOLITICAL

The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic.

Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

### Ukraine Impact - Democracy

#### Russia losing in Ukraine – will take down the authoritarian model

Eli Berman 6-15-2022, IGCC Research Director for International Security Studies and professor of economics at UC San Diego. https://ucigcc.org/news/what-ukraine-is-teaching-us-about-geoeconomics/, "What Ukraine Is Teaching Us About Geoeconomics," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)

I want to add just one thing, which is that, if this war goes on, as it looks like it will, Russia’s economy could start to collapse for lack of spare parts. The demonstration value of that collapse might be that, in two or three years, people will look back and say: this was a war that was won by the sanctions –an unprecedented event.

Granted, there was a period in between the World Wars where trade embargoes were strong, but trade in intermediate goods, and financial markets make economies more interlinked now, and more vulnerable. We’re in a world where the hundred designers of chip manufacturing facilities in Taiwan are critical to global supply chains. Russia is no longer the simple command economy that the neo-Stalinists want to make great again. Its consumers use imported smartphones and cars, full of chips. Its military is also dependent on imported parts and components.

People are going to look back and say: Wow, the authoritarians really killed that place, didn’t they? It was an economy with remarkable human capital and now it’s a dinosaur, like North Korea. I think that’s going to make countries reconsider not just their economic models, but also the models of authoritarian regimes, because of the effect on human capital. Refugees from Russia who you see now everywhere, not just in Europe, but also in Israel, are highly educated, angry, and disappointed people whose lives fell apart. Just like that. They thought that they could deal with the regime but now that hope is gone. They’re very, very talented people. The demonstration value of this authoritarian debacle may end up being the most important part.

#### Ukraine outcome controls trajectory of global democracy

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Both nations have suffered severe losses and need to regenerate military strength. The winner will be the one who is quickest to reconstitute its combat forces at the tactical level and whose leader best motivates his country to fight and manages to enlarge and equip his armed forces, and the logistics to sustain those forces, at the strategic level.

Twenty-first century Russia is using twentieth-century weapons to fight a nineteenth-century war of attrition, combined with eighteenth-century pillaging. Currently, Russia’s numerical advantage in Donbas allows it to grind out a slow advance toward a pointless objective. Even if Russian forces advance to the administrative borders of both oblasts, it will not end the war as long as Ukraine still has the will to fight and the means to do so. If Putin plans to declare victory once his army has cleared Ukraine out of Donbas, he is building on sand. Unlike Georgia or Moldova, Ukraine has the resources and international support to refuse to accept a “frozen conflict.” Instead, the incoming tide of a rebuilt and expanded Ukrainian army will eventually wash those gains away—be it months or years from now.

For a short-lived propaganda victory in Donbas, Putin is destroying the Russian army. If that army revolts in self-defense or collapses under Ukrainian counterattacks, Putin will face the same fate as other Russian rulers who have lost wars. Can the gap between Russian war aims and military capabilities be closed with nuclear weapons? In theory, possibly—but in practice, such an outcome is unlikely. There is no silver bullet to overturn poor strategy, leadership, tactics, and logistics and a lack of will in the face of a motivated opponent.

Despite the prediction two decades ago by political scientist Samuel Huntington that future conflicts would be clashes between different cultural civilizations, we are seeing a clash within a cultural civilization—Orthodox civilization—whose cultural boundaries have been formed by its Eastern Orthodox confession, Byzantine heritage, and Slavic ancestry and languages.[33] This war between the world’s two largest Orthodox states is about more than Ukraine’s ability to join NATO or the European Union. It’s also a fight between two ideas of how people should be governed. One side believes it should be by the decree of the powerful and the other by the consent of the governed. One believes it is entitled to a sphere of influence; the other believes it is entitled to chart its own political future.

A Russian victory in this conflict could serve as a template or inspiration for other revisionist or ideological powers. A Ukrainian victory would do the same for those societies struggling with the challenges of democracy. On the broadest of scales, that is what this war is about.

### Nuclear Deterrence Turn

#### NATO credibility is vital to effective nuclear deterrence

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Take an unambiguous stance on nuclear policy. To relieve the threat of a Russian first-use nuclear strike and regain freedom of action, the United States and NATO must return to core deterrence principles. As it has for many decades, nuclear deterrence rests on both capability and credibility. NATO nuclear forces, though much reduced since the Cold War (especially with respect to theater nuclear systems) are redundant, survivable, and absolutely capable of destroying Russia from end to end. NATO’s credibility, on the other hand, is constantly undermined when leaders publicly express palpable fears that Putin will employ his nuclear arsenal, for unclear reasons and in unclear ways, and that they must at all costs avoid pushing him into a corner. A resolve not to be bullied is essential. Deterrence works best when leaders are direct, unambiguous, resolute, and calm, as John Kennedy was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. As President Emmanuel Macron reminded his public recently, the West has nuclear weapons, too.

### Resolve Turn

#### Only firm resolve deters Putin – reasoning like the DA guts deterrence

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)

Bolster forward presence. As a hedge against further Russian aggression and to reassure allies, the US deployed two additional heavy brigades to Poland in February and early March, along with an airborne brigade, bringing the US rotational “heel-to-toe” brigade there to divisional strength. US divisional and corps-level headquarters were also sent. The US 2nd Cavalry Regiment based in Germany (actually a Stryker brigade) was relocated to Romania at the same time. Additional air units and ground troops from a number of allies have also been deployed to NATO’s eastern flank, while the forty-thousand-soldier NATO Response Force (NRF) has been alerted for the first time in its history.

Putin’s rhetoric and aggressive disinformation and subversion efforts have, for years, targeted the Baltic States, which stand between Kaliningrad and contiguous Russia and extend almost to the suburbs of St. Petersburg. To forestall future aggression and cement firm deterrence, these forces should remain in eastern Europe at least for the near term (i.e., 3–5 years). As the campaign in Ukraine unfolds, Putin should understand clearly that NATO is postured to respond strongly to further escalation. For many years, policymakers have argued strenuously against providing the Baltic States, and NATO’s eastern flank in general, with an adequate defense for fear of “provoking” Russia and to “maintain Alliance unity.” Measures to build up Ukraine’s defensive capacity were resisted for the same reasons; the Barack Obama administration opposed lethal aid, even after the invasions of Crimea and the Donbas, while the Donald Trump administration provided only a trickle. The invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the pitfalls of this thinking. Putin’s threats were intended to keep his neighbors weak, but recent events have proven that it is the perception of weakness, not strength, that provokes him most. Accordingly, a firm defense from the borders of Finnmark to the Black Sea can prevent spillover or regional escalation, communicate resolve, and reassure host-nation publics that the conflict in Ukraine will not land on their doorstep. This is under way with the recent announcement that NATO battlegroups will be posted in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. Meanwhile, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, and others have also pledged to increase their forces in the Baltic States.

To further strengthen deterrence and head off escalation, NATO should thoughtfully consider how best to help the Baltic States help themselves. Though proud members of the 2-percent club, their small economies prevent them from acquiring the air defense and heavy forces they need to deter future Russian aggression. Estonia and Latvia field only a single light brigade each, while Lithuania fields a mechanized brigade with no tanks and a motorized brigade. Using security-assistance funds (such as the European Deterrence Initiative), the United States and NATO could equip existing Baltic formations with modern tanks, self-propelled artillery, and air defense from reserve stocks, along with the training, spare parts, and ammunition needed to make them viable. The Alliance should also strengthen the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) formations in the Baltic States, as Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has suggested. These forces are too small to pose a credible offensive threat, but can defend long enough for other NATO forces, such as the NRF and US armored units in Poland, to move up to assist.

### No Ukraine Escalation

#### Treat Ukraine escalation risk as low – threat fears are self fulfilling

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In this regard, continuous references to the danger of escalation to “World War III” and a steady drumbeat of measures not to be taken can only serve to reassure Putin that he has a free hand in Ukraine. A degree of strategic ambiguity and the possibility of US and NATO intervention should he go too far can be helpful in moderating Russian excesses and controlling escalation. An “all measures on the table” approach will force Russian planners to consider, and prepare for, multiple response scenarios, complicating resource allocation and inducing uncertainty. While deterrence is more art than science, signaling to one’s opponent that one is too frightened to engage is more likely to encourage than to deter.

#### No nuclear escalation from Ukraine – Russia can’t find a use that helps its position – but spurs prolif

Marc De Vore, 6-15-2022, School of International Relations - Senior Lecturer https://ucigcc.org/news/what-ukraine-is-teaching-us-about-geoeconomics/, "What Ukraine Is Teaching Us About Geoeconomics," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)

There’s a third question: what does this mean for nuclear proliferation? There’s been an implicit bargain since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that a lot of states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for nuclear states agreeing not to use them against non-nuclear states. And this was a very specific part of the Budapest Memorandum with Ukraine. Russia has breached that agreement by repeatedly threatening to use nuclear weapons, which could be an argument for other states to want to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Russia has not used these nuclear weapons likely because it can’t figure out an advantageous way to do so. So I can see the war either incentivizing proliferation because states look at this and say, “The only way not to be threatened by nuclear weapons is to have them ourselves,” or I could see states saying, “Here we have a country that has repeatedly made nuclear weapons central to its National Security Strategy, has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, and what do they get from for it? Almost nothing.”

### Hardline Good Turn

#### Concessions to Putin fail

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In short, while these more extreme escalatory options deserve consideration, most would leave Russia in even worse shape and at greater risk. Russian elites almost certainly see this. The more moderate and sensible approach—to withdraw to pre-war boundaries, offer concessions to Ukraine and the West, and open Russia to economic integration and improved relations with the international community—is highly improbable as long as Putin remains in power. The most probable outcome is that Putin will continue to escalate until he is defeated outright, removed from power, or offered concessions he can accept as victory.

### Baltics Turn

#### Russia consolidation leads to Baltic escalation

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The fourth rung

Consolidating gains. Six months into the campaign, Russia will face one of two outcomes. The first is gradual progress through a combination of mounting Ukrainian losses—both military and civilian—that lead to the loss of major urban centers and major groupings of regular forces. Shortages of food, fuel, spare parts, and precision-guided munitions—as well as attrition of major combat systems, such as combat aircraft, main battle tanks, high-altitude air-defense weapons, and self-propelled artillery—could, in time, wear down Ukraine’s defense if not quickly replaced by friendly states. Grinding attrition and catastrophic destruction of industry, agricultural areas, and infrastructure may then force the Ukrainian government to accept a diplomatic settlement that will allow Putin to claim victory. Such a settlement could include Ukrainian acceptance of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, and perhaps Kharkiv and Mariupol, as well as a pledge of permanent neutrality. Putin would also insist on easing of international sanctions as a precondition for a ceasefire. Despite serious losses and tactical defeats, it is too early to count Russia out.

In this case, Putin is likely to consolidate his gains, rebuild and improve his forces, stabilize his internal domestic politics and economy, and attempt to reestablish working relationships with Europe—above all, with Germany. Even costly success in Ukraine will not, however, satisfy Putin. The invasion of Ukraine should be seen as another step in an historic process that includes military aggression in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, and the Donbas, as well as the deployment of Russian troops in frozen conflicts in Armenia and Moldova. Further aggression in areas formerly belonging to the Russian empire—above all, the Baltic States—is highly likely following a period of reorganization and recovery.

Avoiding a stalemate or defeat through extreme escalation. The second outcome is a prolonged stalemate or outright defeat. In this scenario, after staggering losses and a scorched-earth campaign throughout Ukraine, Russian forces remain stalled. Ukrainian regular forces have suffered high losses but remain largely intact with high morale, while territorial defense forces continue to fight effectively. Ukrainian performance is actually improving with combat experience, as well as growing confidence and elan. Western material and financial support remains strong.

Internally, domestic unrest in Russia will become a serious threat to Putin’s regime, as crushing economic hardships mount and Russian losses and lack of military success become more widely known. Russian oligarchs facing financial ruin—as well as government, intelligence, and military elites who fear Putin’s wrath and state collapse—may act to remove Putin from power. Pressure to resolve the conflict and reassert control may become overwhelming.

### Prolif Turn

#### Aff Dual use cooperation turn – checks proliferation and misuse of dangerous technology

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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING QUANTUM TECHNOLOGIES NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL SPACE

The opportunities and challenges of dual-use technologies

Dual-use technologies, capabilities, concepts, and products are ubiquitous, as just about any civilian technology can have a military application. Examples include GPS, vehicle and aircraft sensors, safety equipment, weapons components, and weapons themselves.

As technology has advanced, the possibility for additional dual-use capabilities or new applications of existing capabilities has increased, which creates both opportunities and risks. The proliferation risk of dual-use technology depends on the strength of export control and treaty regimes, which requires cooperation between allies and adversaries alike.

Looking ahead, the rapid pace of technological advancement means organizations such as NATO must demonstrate flexibility and agility in monitoring and understanding technological advancements to determine when or whether innovation can further Alliance aims or contribute to security concerns, and how allies can promote peaceful and responsible uses of emerging technologies.

The Alliance has already demonstrated its commitment to cooperation over emerging technologies by introducing the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and establishing a NATO Innovation Fund in 2021.

By addressing dual-use, emerging technologies in the Strategic Concept, NATO can demonstrate that it recognizes—and prioritizes—the significant opportunities and challenges posed by these technologies. Inclusion in the Strategic Concept will also promote enduring support for ongoing efforts and could spur new initiatives to consider the implications of emerging and possibly disruptive technologies in the future security environment. All of these efforts contribute to NATO’s role in deterring illegitimate pursuits of emerging technologies, while ensuring allies remain at the cutting edge of technological capabilities for their collective defense.

### Climate Turn

#### Aff NATO cooperation is critical to climate mitigation

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As NATO reconceptualizes its role to focus on defense and deterrence while also addressing non-traditional challenges such as emerging technologies and climate change, the Alliance should look for opportunities to strengthen climate and technology cooperation with partners, especially with its closest partner states and like-minded international organizations.

NATO’s network of partners extends to forty states around the world, and it includes some of the most innovative economies and global leaders in addressing climate change. According to the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization Global Innovation Index, eight of the top twenty most innovative global economies are NATO partners. And according to the MIT Green Future Index, which evaluates countries’ ability to transition to a low-carbon future, six of the top twenty states are also NATO partners.

### Science Turn

#### Aff Science focus amplifies NATO strength

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New Partnership Priorities

NATO should identify a set of priorities for cooperation that leverages not only its allies but the strengths of its partners. As evidenced in the data, partner states are international leaders on climate policy, sustainability, and clean technology. They also manage sophisticated markets and innovation ecosystems. They invest heavily in research and development. And they possess world-class human capital. They have as much to offer the Alliance as NATO can offer them in conversations about emerging and disruptive technologies, building climate resilience, science and technology standards, and responding to natural disasters and crises, among others.

The Madrid Strategic Concept will redefine the Alliance’s core tasks. The focus will be on defense and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic, but cooperative security and relations with partners are still relevant given the myriad non-traditional challenges posed by climate, technology, and authoritarianism. Cooperative security is a means of strengthening the Alliance’s relationships with these global innovation and climate leaders, and leveraging their strengths and experiences to help shape and sustain the rules-based international order.

### Russia Won’t Retaliate

#### If Russia escalates, it will be CYBER not kinetic

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Prepare for the most likely area of escalation: cyberspace. As events progressively turn against Putin, the prospect of cyber war will loom ever larger, as it represents one of Russia’s most powerful remaining weapons. Few Western nations possess true offensive cyber capabilities, and the United States alone possesses the ability to deter major cyberattacks by delivering effective and large-scale reprisals. President Joe Biden has issued clear warnings to the private sector to harden its cyber defenses, which remain patchy and incomplete, and put Putin on notice that cyber assaults on critical infrastructure, the financial sector, and other key targets will be met with severe retaliation. A complicating factor is that cyber warfare on a strategic scale has never occurred, and much remains unknown about it. For example, attacks on critical Russian infrastructure, such as power grids and transportation networks, could unintentionally cause civilian deaths, while intrusion into military command-and-control nodes could alarm the commanders of Russia’s nuclear forces. In many respects, the cyber domain remains the realm of the unknown. Like aerial warfare in the early twentieth century, both sides must grope forward and learn as they go. A strong and clearly articulated cyber-deterrence regime, punctuated by sharp demonstrations if necessary, is the best defense here.

#### Russia badly weakened by Ukraine war

ISA, 6-24-2022, Institute for Strategic Analysis (in Azeri: Strateji Təhlil İnstitutu) http://strati.az/news/3727.html, "Russia’s Perceptional Loss Of Global Stature Post-Ukraine Invasion," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)

Summing-up Russia’s military losses in its Ukraine Invasion it is starkly evident that Russian overwhelming conventional military power has been militarily ineffective, Russian Army’s military prowess resting on massed use of firepower is questionable and so also is questionable the ‘fighting will’ of Russian Army.

Economically, Russia’s economic strength and resilience stands emasculated by US & Western sanctions applied post-Ukraine Invasion. Russian economy will be more strangled by Western sanctions if Russian President Putin persists in ‘Turning Defeat into Victory’.

Russia’s vast energy resources on whose high global prices Russian economic stability rested and which provided a $ 400 billion military build-up now is threatened by stringent Western economic sanctions.

Economic deprivations are likely to fuel domestic political discontent with serious implications for stability of the Russian State. Initial indicators are already are emerging to the fore.

In conclusion, what can be summed up is that Russian President Putin’s ‘War of Choice’ in Ukraine Invasion has badly misfired and not only endangers President Putin’s longevity in power at Russia’s helm but more seriously sets-back Russia by decades in its quest for regaining its global stature as an alternative centre of power.

### No Middle East War

**No Mid East escalation**

Imran 19 – Myra, writer for The News International. Citing the international seminar on “Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East”. “Seminar on ‘Strategic dimensions of peace and conflict in South Asia, Middle East’”, The News, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/428298-seminar-on-strategic-dimensions-of-peace-and-conflict-in-south-asia-middle-east>, 02-06-2019

Islamabad : **There is a need to study the causes of proxy wars, and what are the potential impacts of such wars on the overall conflict. These thoughts in a daylong international seminar on ‘Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in** South Asia and **the Middle East,’ organised by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS**), an Islamabad-based think tank, **participated by prominent national and international scholars.**

**Prof**. Shahram **Akbarzadeh**, Deakin University, Australia, **argued there is significant gap in the literature on non-state actors**. He called for empirical research, along with concrete policy suggestions, on the topic, so as to mitigate the conflicts in the region, in particular South Asia and Middle East.

Speakers grappled at the notion of non-state actors and proxy wars: PIPS director Muhammad Amir Rana said **non-state actors often evoke memories of violent elements**. This despite that as per definition, non-state actors include organizations working for human rights.

Prof. Syed Rifaat Hussain, Department of Government and Public Policy, NUST, said the term “proxy wars” is a contested notion. There is no universal agreement on its definition, nor on the set of circumstances behind such wars. Interestingly, he said, proxy wars are as old as the phenomena of conventional war itself.

Speakers noted **proxy wars are instruments of state power**. As to why states go for it, it was argued, **it is because they are often cheap undertaking to change the status quo**.

Participants noted over the decades, **much of the conflict involves non-state actors**. **Interstate conflict**, on the other hand, **has declined**. In recent times, he said **tit-for-tat tactics on behalf of such actors have reduced their appeal.**

Dr. Ibrahim **Fraihat**, Doha Institute of Graduate Studies, Doha, **termed proxy war as an arms conflict between two parties, though one of them is not directly involved**. This way, **domestic conflicts are escalated by external power intervention**. At the same time, proxy war, if unresolved, can take the shape of conventional war, the most significant example was of Vietnam War. **In contemporary times**, he lamented, **the Middle East has been rendered a stock market of proxy organizations.**

William Gueriache, Associate Professor American University in the Emirates Dubai, said on surface, all states support open diplomacy and multilateralism. Yet the survival of patronage has paved the way for foreign intervention during conflicts in the whole Middle East.

Dr. Marwan Kablan, Director Policy Analysis at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Doha, also hinted multiplicity of actors involved in Syrian conflict, calling it as mother of conflicts in the region. It was said that wars cannot be ended unless patron states achieve their interests.

Dr. Shaheen Akhtar, Professor National Defence University Islamabad focused on the apprehension of Pakistan about India’s involvement in Afghanistan. She said Pakistan’s uneasy relationship with Kabul reinforces a perception of encirclement while growing US-India strategic cooperation further aggravates these apprehensions.

**Dr**. Muhammad Riaz **Shad**, National University of Modern Languages (NUML) Islamabad, said **fighting through proxies gives states an opportunity of deniability**.

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#### Domestic pushback to plan guts US leadership – turns case

T.J. Pempel 6-15-2022, Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley https://ucigcc.org/news/what-ukraine-is-teaching-us-about-geoeconomics/, "What Ukraine Is Teaching Us About Geoeconomics," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)

I want to turn back to the question of how this Ukraine-Russia interaction plays out in terms of state strategies vis-a-vis economics. We’ve seen a lot of economic cooperation, but at the heart of some of the questions you’ve been asking is this notion that nation-states are going to be predisposed to look for national economic security, which will mean developing a capacity for relative strength—independent strength—vis a vis global changes. The difficulty is that most states can’t do this, and there’s a strong impulse toward economic cooperation along the technological gradient that will allow states to make up for their potential deficiencies. We’ve talked at this conference about semiconductors and it seems pretty clear that no state, even if it does make major moves in that direction, is going to be capable of complete autarky in a whole host of these high-tech areas.

The second piece of this relates to domestic politics in the U.S. What we’re seeing in the United States is a growing resistance on the part of segments of the Republican Party to the development of international support for Ukraine. We’re seeing resistance to U.S. aid for the military, and we’re seeing much broader isolationism that goes back to the MAGA mentality. This has a ripple effect in terms of how other states will perceive their capacity to rely on the United States economically. The idea of the U.S. as a reliable economic and security partner is very much at risk.